This paper tries to provide a preliminary description of the mental process individuals experience in their attempt to comprehend stated probabilities of simple lotteries.
Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that in situations of decision making under risk, people do not exhibit a clear understanding of the stated probabilities of possible outcomes, as re ‡ected in their choices. Decision makers often appear to behave as though distorting their perception of probabilities. Indeed, this phenomenon was experimentally tested and documented by Preston and Baratta (1947), Mosteller and Nogee (1951) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) .
In an attempt to reconcile this research with a coherent theory, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) proposed an inverse S-shaped probability weight function that conformed more accurately to observed behavior. This theory has been widely studied and extensively tested. However, for the most part, neither research in psychology nor in decision theory has addressed the question of the reasons for and the mechanisms of the distortion phenomenon.
Understanding its mechanism is not only of theoretical interest in and of itself, but may also reveal the full scope of its in ‡uence, which is as yet unclear.
This paper attempts to provide a possible account of how and why people tend to distort probabilities. We start from the expected utility paradigm (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) , suggesting that a lottery (x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n ) (where x i are outcomes and p i are probabilities) be evaluated according to U ((x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n )) = X
for a real-valued utility function u. Formula (1) might be taken as a description of an explicit computation that a decision maker performs when evaluating a prospect. In this literal interpretation, the decision maker is aware of a numerical utility function, calculates the U-value of each lottery, and chooses a maximizer of (1) . In this case, the decision maker would have no reason to distort probabilities beyond the possible rounding-o¤ necessary to simplify calculations.
However, (1) may be considered as a metaphor of a cognitive process that is not explicitly algebraic and need not contain a speci…c utility function. More concretely, equation
(1) might be regarded as suggesting that each outcome x i invokes some rough hedonic evaluation, which we model by u(x i ), as a measure of desirability. This measure of desirability interacts with a measure of plausibility, p i , in a way that we approximate by p i u(x i ). The aggregation of all these possible outcomes, modeled as the sum of these expressions, is a measure of the evaluation of the lottery.
This more metaphorical interpretation of (1) raises the question of how the probability numbers, stated in the problem to be p i , re ‡ect the plausibility judgments. For instance, how do decision makers respond to a stated probability such as p i = 1 6 or p i = 0:347?
In this paper we take the view that decision makers attempt to make sense of stated probabilities by associating them with relative frequencies of these (or of similar) stated probabilities encountered in risk situations in the past 1 . For instance, faced with the stated
, an individual is reminded of all past cases in which she had tossed fair coins.
Each toss of a coin is associated with the implicit but well-known probability of 1 2 . Thus, most adults who have many cases of p i = 1 2 -tosses in memory 2 , when introduced with any new such case, would bring these past cases to mind. Hence, relying on the relative frequency would lead to an assessment of probability around 1 2 . If, however, the decision maker is faced with p i = 0:347, it may well be the case that she had never encountered lotteries involving this exact probability in the past. How would the decision maker interpret such a probability number? We suggest that she may base her judgement on prior experience with similar values such as p i = 1 3 .
The decision maker's experience is modeled as a set of cases. In this context, a case 1 This is inspired by case-based decision theory (CBDT) introduced by Schmeidler (1995 and 2001) . However, the context and formulation here are di¤erent. 2 The term memory has the same meaning as experience and is de…ned explicitly in section 3.
consists of the stated probability of an outcome and a result indicating whether the outcome had materialized. The process of evaluating a probability is a comparison of the current case to stated probabilities of past cases residing in the decision maker's memory while taking into account their realization. This procedure formalizes the evaluation of probabilities based on the relative frequencies of outcomes. However, not only does it consider identical cases to the one at hand, but it considers similar cases as well. This type of procedure may lead to distortion of probabilities as in Prospect Theory Tversky, 1979 and 1992) , namely, overvaluation of low probabilities and undervaluation of high probabilities.
We assume that even if the decision maker is unable to understand the meaning of a stated probability, she is nevertheless able to establish a level of similarity between probabilities. For example, she is able to say that the probability of landing on "1" when tossing a red die is identical to the probability of landing on that same number when tossing a blue die, even without knowing the real probability of landing on "1". She can also understand that the probability of landing on a speci…c number, when spinning a roulette wheel containing 30 numbers is closer to the probability of landing on that number when the spinning wheel contains 31 numbers than when it contains 32 numbers.
Probably the most basic similarity function is that of a "frequentist" who assigns a positive similarity to identical cases and no similarity at all to any other case. This results in an evaluation of stated probabilities based only on relative frequencies of identical cases.
This approach is sensible if the decision maker has a huge memory that includes many cases for each stated probability in question. If memory is not that exhaustive, for some stated probabilities p i we may …nd that the set of cases in which p i was encountered is very small or even empty. This would mean that empirical frequencies are not very reliable, if at all well-de…ned. In these cases, the process presented in this paper, which allows for decisions based on comparison of similar situations is more realistic. The decision maker will generally be able to approximate an assessment. Moreover, allowing consideration of similar cases may produce evaluations that are closer to the true probabilities.
We assume that the degree of similarity between two given cases depends on the decision maker's experience and in particular on the number occurrences of cases in memory.
By analogy, imagine a situation where a doctor needs to evaluate the probability of success of a treatment. An experienced doctor who has a large memory to draw on can a¤ord to use only very similar cases. By contrast, an inexperienced doctor might end up with a very small memory were she to use only very similar cases. Hence she would tend to use a more permissive similarity function. In this context, we assume that only the numerical degree of similarity varies as memory grows however the similarity (ordinal) ranking does not change.
That is, doctors may agree that case x resembles case y more than case z, while implicitly disagreeing about the relevance of z. In our model, we similarly assume that the larger the memory, the lower the weight assigned to distant probabilities and the higher the weight assigned to close probabilities. This property will be shown to imply that even though the decision maker is not able to understand the exact meaning of the stated probabilities, she will eventually learn to evaluate them according to their true probabilities.
The next section illustrates the model and shows how it can account for the version of the Allais paradox known as "the common ratio e¤ect. Section 3 introduces the formal model, followed by an elaboration of the case of the k-nearest neighbors similarity function in section 4. Section 5 shows examples. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Illustration
The "Allais Paradox,"perhaps one of the most prominent examples of discrepancies between behavior predicted by expected utility theory and observed behavior, was resolved by using distortion of probabilities. The common ratio version of the "Allais Paradox" states that most people faced with a choice between winning $3000 with a probability of 1 or winning $4000 with a probability of 0.8 prefer the former lottery over the latter. When faced with the choice between winning $3000 with a probability of 0.25 or winning $4000 with a probability of 0.2, most people prefer the latter lottery over the former, which violates the independence axiom (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
In this context it may be natural to ask what kind of memory generates these preferences. Let's suppose that memory includes cases with the probabilities of 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
This re ‡ects the knowledge of a decision maker with considerable experience in tosses of two fair coins in conjunction. When confronted with a probability of 0.8, she tends to undervalue it, since it most resembles 0.75. On the other hand, the probability of 0.2 is overvalued since it resembles 0.25. This can lead to the pattern of preferences stated above. Note that this solution depends on the probabilities in the decision maker's memory and di¤erent memories may lead to di¤erent preferences.
A di¤erent explanation for the same version of the "Allais Paradox" was presented by Rubinstein (1988) . As Rubinstein pointed out, most theories of decision-making under risk do not deal with the mental processes involved in reaching a decision. Rubinstein's model includes lotteries that o¤er a certain prize with a certain probability (and otherwise zero). He suggests the procedure, according to which, if the probabilities involved in two lotteries are similar but the prizes are not, preference is determined by the higher prize, and vice versa if the prizes are similar but the probabilities are not. In the example of the common ratio e¤ect above, Rubinstein's explanation is that the probabilities 0.2 and 0.25 are similar, whereas 0.8 and 1 are not. Hence the choice between 0.2 of $4000 and 0.25 of $3000 is governed by the higher prize, whereas the choice between 0.8 of $4000 and $3000 with certainty need not be determined by the higher prize.
The present paper shares the basic motivation of Rubinstein (1988) , namely, to explicitly model the mental process of choice in a plausible way. The two models also rely on the concept of similarity. But there are several important di¤erences between the two models. of probabilities is a method for determining which lottery is preferable, whereas the process described here is only a preliminary stage in the evaluation of stated probabilities.
The Model
A decision maker faced with a situation of risk must evaluate each probability of a lottery l = (x 1 ; q 1 ; :::; x n ; q n ) with n possible outcomes. The outcomes are x i for i = 1; :::; n and stated probabilities of these outcomes are q i ; for i = 1; :::; n which are all positive numbers that add to 1.
The premise of this paper is closely related to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) , therefore it will follow the terms and notation that were proposed there. Let P (0; 1) be a …nite set of stated probabilities and L be a set of lotteries that are composed of these stated
Let M be a …nite set of all possible cases that the decision maker may experience in di¤erent lotteries. A case is a pair (p; d) where p 2 P is a stated probability of an outcome in a lottery and d 2 D f0; 1g assumes the value of 1 if the outcome was realized and 0 otherwise. Thus,
A decision maker's memory will be modeled by a function:
that counts the number of occurrences of each case in M that the decision maker actually experienced. Each experience of a lottery with h possible outcomes adds h new occurrences of cases to memory. For example, imagine a person whose memory includes only one lottery l = (x 1 ; p i ; x 2 ; 1 p i ) that was repeated ten times, in which the …rst outcome was realized twice and the second outcome was realized eight times. Her memory I will be: I(p i ; 1) = 2;
I(1 p i ; 1) = 8; I(p i ; 0) = 8 and I(1 p i ; 0) = 2 and I(p j ; 1) = I(p j ; 0) = 0 for p j 6 = p i : Later on we will see that the decision maker evaluates q both from outcomes that were realized as well as from outcomes that were not.
The similarity function s is based on the distance between q; the probability that is being evaluated and p; a stated probability in the decision maker's memory. Let s
be a continuous, single peaked function, that strictly decreases as the distance between its two arguments increases. Moreover, s(q; p) assumes a value of one if and only if p and q are identical and the value of zero only if the distance between q and p is one. We assume in addition that s(q; p) is twice di¤erentiable 3 .
The level of similarity between two stated probabilities is not only determined by the similarity function but also depends on the size of memory. Let be proportional to the size of memory, i.e. = P (p;d) 2M I(p; d) for a …nite and positive . We assume that a case in which p is the stated probability is considered similar to the present one to the degree s(q; p) :
Let q be a stated probability to be evaluated, the evaluation process can be described by:
Two special similarity function are s(q; p) = 1 if q = p and 0 otherwise, and s(q; p) = 1
for all p and q 4 . In the …rst example q is evaluated solely by the realization of cases in memory with a stated probability of q and all other cases are disregarded. In the second example all occurrences of cases in memory are teated equally.
This model focuses on cases that fall in between these two extreme examples. Since If we were to ignore in the de…nition of q, formula (2) becomes
This formula (3) for evaluation of probabilities was axiomatized in Gilboa, Lieberman, di¤er with the size of memory no longer falls into their framework 5 . We …nd formula (2) used here more reasonable than formula (3) used in Gilboa et. al (2004) because the former captures the intuition that, with data around, people prefer to rely on identical rather than nearly similar cases. Thanks to this feature of the model, an evaluator using (2) who has a lot of experience with lotteries would eventually learn the real probabilities. As memory grows, evaluation of probabilities converges to the real frequency of outcomes.
The subjects of Preston and Baratta's (1947) experiments were both faculty members who had substantial experience with probabilities and graduate students who had none. The results indicated that both groups distorted probabilities, however the distortion was greater among the group of students who had no experience. This learning process is captured by proposition 1.
For the purpose of proposition 1 we assume that each lottery in memory is repeated an in…nite number of times and that outcomes of the lotteries are independent. The underlying state space is = (L; X) N where N denotes the natural numbers. A state is ! = ((l 1 ; x 1 ) ; (l 2 ; x 2 ) :::) 2 where l t 2 L is the experienced lottery at time t and x t 2 X is the realized outcome. The probability measure on satis…es the following two conditions:
1. (x i t j 8(l 1 ; x 1 ); :::; (l t 1 ; x t 1 ) 2 ; and l t = (x 1 t ; p 1 ; :::; x n t ; p n )) = p i , meaning that stated probabilities are equal to the true probabilities and are independent of past outcomes.
2. (! j 9l 2 L and 9T such that 8t > T l 6 = l t ) = 0, meaning that each lottery is repeated an in…nite number of times.
Proposition 1 Let and be as described above. Take any q 2 P , then q converges in probability to q:
All proofs can be found in the appendix. The proof is based on the fact that s(q; p)
decreases as the distance between p and q increases. When grows to in…nity, only identical cases in ‡uence the evaluation of q. Moreover, the law of large numbers insures that the evaluation converges to the actual probability 6 .
We assume that each case in memory is repeated an in…nite number of times, independently of past periods. This guarantees convergence of the relative frequencies of occurrence of the most similar case, which, in turn, implies the convergence of q. But even when the number of repetitions of some cases is …nite, the limit of q still exists and is simply the relative frequency of cases that most resemble q. Even if the assumption that the stated probability p is equal to its true probability is false, the decision maker will nevertheless evaluate q according to its true probability. Therefore, as long as the decision maker assigns the highest similarity only to identical cases, she will be able to learn the true probability.
There are a few properties of this evaluation process that should be emphasized.
Whenever memory includes lotteries with only two outcomes, (p; 1) and (1 p; 0) both must have the same number of occurrences. If, in addition, s is symmetric in the sense that: for every q and p s(q; p) = s(1 q; 1 p) then the sum of the evaluations of q and (1 q) equal one. Moreover, if for all cases (p; d) in memory I(p; d) is replaced by I(1 p; d)), then the new evaluation of q will be the old evaluation of (1 q): Following from these properties, the evaluation of q = 0:5 will always be 0:5 for every possible memory I and any . According to this evaluation process, people immediately understand the probability 0:5. This type of probability distortion resembles Quiggin's (1982) probability weights in that his symmetry assumption leads to 0:5 being a …xed point of the probability distortion function. However, when memory includes lotteries with more than two outcomes and s k is concave in p and symmetric, then q cuts the 45 line at a point less than 0:5. This in turn may resemble Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) probability weights that cut the 45 line between 0:2 and 0:3 (although in the present model there will be more than one intersection point for a large 6 The limit of q is a step function where q for q = 2 P converges to the stated probability of its most similar case.
enough -see examples in section 5).
Until now, it was assumed that the decision maker can establish which probabilities are closer to each other and that she can remember the outcomes. A priori the decision maker cannot determine that high probabilities have a better chance of being realized than low probabilities. The estimation of q is a function of the frequency of the realizations of each probability in memory. If in fact the realization of high probabilities in memory occurred relatively more times than those of low probabilities, the decision maker will understand that outcomes of high probabilities are more likely to be realized and vice versa. We de…ne a monotonically increasing memory as a memory in which for all p 2 P , if p p 0 then
.
Proposition 2 If memory is monotonically increasing and
cally increasing in q: That is, if0 then0 (the last inequality is reversed if memory is monotonically decreasing).
The meaning of proposition 2 is that, under relatively unrestrictive assumptions on the structure of the similarity function s; the decision maker understands that outcomes of high probabilities are more likely to be realized than those of low probabilities. For the case where s is a function of , where = jp qj, the requirement that
0 has a natural interpretation as it implies that s is in concave in . This will indicate that changing the distance by a little for cases that are considered close will not in ‡uence the similarity as much as changing the distance when are cases are further away from each other.
Furthermore, with this method of evaluating probabilities low probabilities will be overvalued while high probabilities will be undervalued. If the relative frequency of each stated probability in memory is equal to its real probability, then proposition 3 implies the overvaluation of all probabilities lower than the lowest stated probability in memory. Likewise, all probabilities higher than the highest stated probability will be undervalued. Note that if the lowest relative frequency of some stated probability in memory is zero, proposition 3 no longer assures this distortion of probabilities. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that the overvaluation of very low probabilities and undervaluation of very high probabilities will still occur. Since s assumes a value of zero only if the distance between q and p is one, then q(0) > 0 and q(1) < 1: Due to the continuity of q; low stated probabilities will be overvalued and high stated probabilities will be undervalued.
This result corroborates the evidence of Tversky (1979, 1992) where decision makers are very sensitive to the di¤erences between certain and uncertain situations.
It may appear that only stated probabilities that are arbitrarily close to zero are guaranteed to be overvalued and, likewise, only stated probabilities that are arbitrarily close to one are guaranteed to be undervalued. However, it is possible to show that, given a memory in which p l and p h are the lowest and highest stated probabilities, respectively, on average all q < p l are overvalued and all q > p h are undervalued. The next example illustrates that the overvaluation of small stated probabilities and the undervaluation of high stated probabilities is signi…cant. In particular, on average, even low stated probabilities higher than p l are overvalued and high stated probabilities lower than p h are undervalued. , E( q) < q .
This model should be applied only to a situation with non-trivial risk. There is no mathematical limitation that prevents the evaluation of an outcome with a probability of zero or one. But the model would then imply that the stated probabilities of zero and one are always distorted, so that q(0) will always be greater than zero and q(1) will always be smaller than one 7 . We …nd this result counterintuitive. Yet, we do not believe that a model that explains the evaluation of probabilities in (0; 1) should also apply to f0; 1g : Rather, we maintain that the mental process of making decisions under risk is not the same as that of making decisions under certainty. Consequently the probabilities of zero and one need not be evaluated according to their relative frequencies or their similarity to other cases.
Modi…cations of the similarity function
The previous section was restricted to continuous similarity functions. Perhaps this speci…-cation is too limited, since it does not include the k nearest neighbors model (k-NN), which is extensively used in computer science (see, e.g., Cover and Hart, 1967 and Duda and Hart, 1973 ). The most common use of the k-NN model is for classi…cation problems where the prediction of the outcome of a new case is determined by the most frequent outcome among the k nearest neighbors. The k-NN model was generalized to include other cases, such as regressions that take the average of the outcomes of the k nearest neighbors. In this case all 7 There are speci…c similarity functions that are not de…ned when comparing cases with non-trivial risk to cases of certainty. See section 5 example 2.
k nearest neighbors are treated equally (Cover, 1968) . There also exist other variants of this model that let the closest points among the k nearest neighbors have more in ‡uence on the outcome by taking a weighted average. One of the main goals of k-NN model is to …nd the optimal number of neighbors that performs best in predictions.
In the context of this model the similarity function based on the k nearest neighbor is s(q; p) =
and the evaluation process can be described by:
Notice that since s(q; p) 2 f0; 1g the power of from the previous section is omitted.
Note, however, that the roles that , the size of memory and K, the number of neighbors play in the evaluation of q are similar.
The similarity between a stated probability q and a case with probability p does not only depend on the distance between p and q but also on the distance between q and the rest of the cases in memory. If a case is among the k nearest neighbors then the similarity is equal to one, otherwise it is zero. Observe that according to this de…nition there might actually be more than k occurrences with a similarity of one. This is because each case in memory can be repeated a number of times and this de…nition allows us to assign the same similarity value to identical cases.
Proposition 1 only relies on the assumption that s(q; p) is single-peaked, namely that s(q; q) = 1 and s(q; p) < 1 if p 6 = q. Hence, a counterpart of proposition 1 for the k-NN similarity function will hold in the case of the k-NN as long as the following two conditions are satis…ed:
The …rst condition (6) assure that, at the limit, the only relevant cases in the evaluation of q are cases with a stated probability q; that is, these condition lead to a similarity function s(q; p), which is equal to one if p = q and otherwise to zero. The last condition (7) assures that the evaluation of q converges in probability to the true probability. Adding the condition that, lim P An alternative way to de…ne the k-NN similarity function is to de…ne it on cases instead of on occurrences. By this de…nition, s(q; p) is equal to one if p belongs to one of the k nearest cases in memory and is equal to zero otherwise. In this case proposition 1 will hold if K = 1. However, it is more natural to look at each occurrence as a separate neighbor rather than looking at a group of occurrences as a separate neighbor.
We cannot prove Proposition 2 using the same method as before, however it is simple to show that proposition 2 still holds for the case of the k-NN similarity function. The proof relies on the fact that the evaluation of a stated probability is a weighted average of relative frequencies of the k nearest neighbors. For a stated probability q which is larger than q 0 the relative frequencies of the k nearest neighbors of q are at least as large as those of q 0 if memory is monotonically increasing .
Proposition 5 Consider the k-NN similarity function. If memory is monotonically increasing, then q is monotonically increasing in q: That is, if0 then0 (the last inequality is reversed if memory is monotonically decreasing).
Proposition 3 also holds for the case of the k-NN where low probabilities are overvalued and high probabilities are undervalued. Proposition 4 must be modi…ed since s(q; p)
no longer relies only on the distance between q and p, but also on the distance between q and the rest of the cases in memory. However, given that cases in memory have a uniform distribution, for q < 1 2 there is a greater chance that q has more neighbors that are higher rather than lower than q resulting in the overvaluation of q on average. The reverse is true if q > As can be seen from the graphs, when the size of memory grows, the evaluation of q converges to p as stated in Proposition 1. The evaluation of q is monotonically increasing since memory is monotonically increasing as stated in Proposition 2 and Proposition 5.
Finally, low stated probabilities are overvalued and high stated probabilities are undervalued as stated in Proposition 3.
Conclusions
Wakker (2004) It is possible to expand our model to deal with distortion of cumulative probabilities, but this requires assuming much more understanding of the connection between probabilities and prizes on the part of the decision maker. Speci…cally, the decision maker would …rst have to arrange the prizes in memory according to their order and calculate the cumulative stated probabilities and only then proceed with the evaluation process of these cumulative stated probabilities. A case would consists of a cumulative stated probability of winning at least
x and a result indicating whether this outcome had occurred. When arranging these cases in memory, the decision maker would have to understand that if the outcome of winning at least x was realized, then all outcomes of winning a prize smaller than x were realized as well. Likewise, if this outcome was not realized then neither were all outcomes of winning a prize greater than x.
When dealing with a decision maker's perception of probabilities, one must keep in mind that the sample of experiences may be biased. Memory can include, among other things, personal experience, friends'and family's experiences as well as information published in newspapers. The selection of cases and outcomes may not be random; rather, it may include many extraordinary cases, especially when the source of information is not personal. as the relative frequency of p and
as the evaluation of q based on those …rst t lotteries. Denote
The proof has three stages:
1. The …rst stage is to show that p lim t!1 q t (q = p s ) = g t (!; p s ) for 8p s 2 P:
2. The second stage is to show that E h It(ps;1) It(ps;1)+It(ps;0) i = p s for 8p s 2 P for t large enough:
3. The third stage is to show that q(q = p s ) converges in probability to p s for 8p s 2 P:
Stage 1: Take any q = p s 2 P; then 
Stage 3: By stage 1 for every " there exists a t 1 > t 0 such that for all t > t 1
By stage 2 E [g t (!; p s )] = p s so for every " there exists a t 2 > t 0 such that for all t > t 2 P (! j (jg t (!; p s ) p s j) > ") < " due to the law of large numbers.
Given " take t > max(t 1 ; t 2 ):
So q(q = p s ) converges in probability to p s :
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof relies on a lemma proved by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) . The lemma is constructed as follows: Let f = (f 1 ; :::; f l ) and g = (g 1 ; :::; g l ) be two positive vectors such that P l f l = P l g l . Let h = (h 1 ; :::h l ) be a vector satisfying h 1 ::: h l .
Assume that for all , i < j
Let us arrange the cases in the decision maker's memory according to those that were realized (d = 1) and those that were not (d = 0), and within each category, let us order the cases by p where p 1 ::: p l . We have h 1
::: h l since
:::
In addition, notice that q = f h and q 0 = g h; so all we have to show is that if @ 2 s(q;p) @q@p 0, the inequalities, for all i < j
hold, which in this case are reduced to 8 i < j
We will examine each position of p i and p j with respect to q and q 0 separately.
(i) The …rst case is p i q 0 < q p j . In this case both jq 0 p i j < jq p i j and jq 0 p j j > jq p j j therefore, s(q 0 ; p i ) > s(q; p i ) and s(q 0 ; p j ) < s(q; p j ) so, the inequality holds.
(ii) The second case is q 0 p i < p j q: In this case both jq 0 p i j < jq 0 p j j and jq p i j > jq p j j therefore, s(q 0 ; p i ) > s(q 0 ; p j ) and s(q; p i ) < s(q; p j ) so, the inequality holds.
(iii) The third case is q 0 < q p i < p j . The inequality
holds if and only (v) The …fth case is q 0 < p i q p j : With R de…ned as above, let us look at
Together with dR dq > 0 it follows that R > 0 8 : Hence, the inequality holds. 8 Even though it may be the case that s 0 q (q; p i ) and s 0 q (q; p j ) do not exist at q = p i and q = p j ; respectively, it is su¢ cient that s 0 q+ (q; p i ) and s 0 q (q; p j ) exist for the proof to follow through.
(vi) The sixth case is p i q 0 p j < q: With R de…ned as above, once more, let us look
Together with dR dq 0 < 0 it follows that R > 0 9 : Hence, the inequality holds.
Since (i) to (vi) cover all possible cases, we get that for q 0 < q and all p i < p j
which concludes the proof. 
We divide this inequality by P (p;d)2M I(p; d)s(q; p) k > 0 and get
Thereforeforl . The proof forh =
is similar. 
Since the denominator is positive for all memories, E p 1 ;:::;p L () > 0 ()
Since p i is iid E p 1 ;:::;p L ( q(q) q) > 0 , (s(q; p)(p q) + s(q; 1 p)(1 p q) dp = Therefore E p 1 ;:::;p L () > 0 for q < Since all addends are non negative the expression is non negative. Hence,0 as required.
